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Abstract 
This article presents a study of the degree to which national institutional settings impact 
on the application of management practices in foreign subsidiaries of multinational 
companies. Applying the national business systems approach our study centres on the use 
of calculative human resource management (HRM) practices by subsidiaries of US 
multinational companies in the UK, Ireland, Germany, Denmark/Norway and Australia, 
respectively, in comparison with these countries’ indigenous firms. The analysis indicates 
that while US subsidiaries adapt to the local setting in terms of applying calculative HRM 






The purpose of this article is to study the degree to which national institutional settings 
impact on managerial practices in foreign subsidiaries of multinational companies 
(MNCs). We address the question as to whether such subsidiaries will transfer and apply 
practices that are prevalent in the country-of-origin or whether they will adapt to the local 
institutional environment. This question will be approached through an analysis of the 
application of three characteristically US human resource management (HRM) practices, 
individual performance appraisals, individual rewards systems or merit pay, and monitoring 
of the effectiveness of training, in indigenous firms and subsidiaries of US multinational 
companies located in four European settings, the UK, Ireland, Germany and 
Denmark/Norway, together with Australia. On the basis of institutional theory we test 
hypotheses concerning differences in the application of these practices between US 
subsidiaries and indigenous firms in all five countries, between indigenous firms by 
country and between US subsidiaries by country.  
. 
Theoretical Background 
During the last decades a broad array of research focusing on institutional determinants of 
managerial and organizational practices has been published. Different directions can be 
distinguished, carrying labels such as varieties of capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 2003; 
Hall & Gingerich, 2004), national business systems (Whitley, 1992; 1999), work systems 
(Geppert et al., 2003), cultural systems (e.g., Myloni et al., 2004) and new institutional 
organizaton theory (e.g., Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). Although these 
theoretical perspectives diverge on important dimensions, they all share the conception 
that institutional factors are more important antecedents of management practices than are 
rational factors, such as technology, firm size, and industrial embeddedness. Institutional 
factors have evolved as a result of long historical processes that have generated significant 
national and regional differences. The point of departure is the notion that social 
institutions contribute heavily to the development and use of various administrative 
practices and systems in firms and other organizations (e.g., Whitley, 1992; Whitley, 
1999; Maurice & Sorge, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001). This approach has increasingly 
been applied in comparative empirical studies of the actual application of managerial and 
organizational practices in different countries and regions (Gooderham et al., 1998, 1999; 
Geppert et al., 2002; Geppert, 2002; Geppert et al., 2003; Sorge, 2004). 
  Moreover, there is a growing body of work focusing on the transfer of such practices 
across countries through the operations of multinational companies, which is also the 
focus of this article (Ferner, 1997; Gooderham et al., 1998; Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998; 
Edwards & Ferner, 2000; Ferner, 2000; Ferner, 2003; Harzing & Sorge, 2003). Kostova 
and Roth (2002:215) have argued that an important source of competitive advantage for 
MNCs is the utilization of their organizational capabilities on a worldwide basis through 
the leveraging of their management practices across their subsidiaries. However, they also 
point to the need subsidiaries have to achieve and maintain legitimacy in the environment 
in which they operate (Gooderham et al., 1999). That is they experience pressure to adopt 
local practices and become isomorphic with the local institutional context. Hereby there 
lies a tension between the need for global integration, on the one hand, and local 
adaptation, on the other. At the subsidiary level this is experienced as two sets of 
pressures. They are both confronted by an external host country institutional environment 
and by pressures from within the organization to become isomorphic to the parent 
organization’s norms (Harzing, 2002:213).  
   The implication is that the degree of global integration should vary according to the 
degree to which the local institutional context the subsidiary confronts differs from the 
norms of the parent organization. By extension, because these norms will be substantially 
derived from the parent organization’s own institutional environment, the degree of local 
adaptation will reflect the degree of divergence between the local institutional context and 
the parent institutional context. In this article we will empirically test this proposition by 
analysing the degree to which characteristically US HRM practices are applied by 
subsidiaries of US MNCs in Australia and across four European settings, the UK, Ireland, 
Germany, and Denmark/Norway combined.  
  Standard neo-institutional explanations of management practices and strategies predict 
similarity among firms that operate in the same industry or organizational field within the 
context of a single society or national economy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Dobbin, 
Sutton, Meyer and Scott, 1993; Gulati, 1999; Hitt et al., 2004; Peng, 2005; Peng et al., 
2005). While one may expect differences between industries, within industries and not 
least within firms, firms will implement those practices that are deemed to contribute to 
the achievement of external legitimacy. Although new institutionalism in organizational 
theory implies a rejection of rational actor models, emphasizing instead the pressures for 
acquiring and maintaining legitimacy in relation to the environment (see, e.g. DiMaggio, 
1983; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991), it shares the broad, 
long- term expectation that uniform pressures will lead to intra-industry uniformity of 
management practices (McNamara et al., 2002). That is, they both presuppose 
isomorphism. 
  This is in contrast with the growing body of literature that has been assigned the label 
national business systems in which the focus is on national cultures and unique societal 
and institutional structures and how these support dissimilar business and management 
practices (Mayer and Whittington, 2002). That is, these two research directions diverge 
radically in regard to the convergence of practices across different national settings. While 
the neo-institutionalist reasoning assumes a dissemination of standard management 
practices and a subsequent development towards universality of practice across the MNC 
regardless of national setting, the national business systems approach research is 
preoccupied with the sustainability of the influence of national culture and institutions on 
such practices.  Hence, in terms of the national business systems perspective, MNCs will 
tend to be sensitive to the possibility of significant cross-national differences in 
management practices. Additionally, on the basis the national business systems approach 
it is reasonable to postulate that the degree to which a foreign subsidiary will deviate in 
terms of its management practices will be determined by the degree to which the national, 
institutional setting of the parent company diverges from that of the subsidiary.   
   As this article focuses on the potential adaptations made by subsidiaries of US MNCs 
across different national settings, we will firstly delineate the institutional setting of US 
MNCs and the resultant characteristic US HRM practices. Thereafter we will briefly 
describe the institutional contexts of the five selected national settings. This will form the 
basis on which we formulate and test our three hypotheses. 
 
The US Context and Calculative HRM Practices 
   Weinstein and Kochan (1995) divide US employment relations from the late 1930s to 
the present day into two phases, the New Deal industrial relations system, which extended 
from the 1930s through the 1970s and more recent developments, which we will refer to 
as US HRM.  
   In the 1970s, American mass production grappled with the persistent effects of 
increased international competition and a more uncertain business environment. New 
flexible productive techniques emerged in the wake of advances in information 
technology stimulating a shift in competitive strategy toward flexible specialization aimed 
at producing differentiated, high-value-added products (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Coupled 
to these changes were significant changes to the institutional environment in which unions 
became increasingly marginalized while management and shareholders increased their 
power. In this, as Weinstein and Kochan (1995:27) observe, "Government played an 
important role by weakening its enforcement of labour and employment laws and by 
allowing (some would say encouraging) a harder line by management in its resistance to 
unions". As Ferner (2000) and Ferner et al. (2004) argue the American business system 
that emerged can be understood as a distinctive model of economic organisation within 
the general category of “liberal market economies”. It is characterized by a dominant 
individualist ethos and a strong anti-union mentality among many American employers. 
Overall, pay and performance management became characterized by the innovative use of 
performance systems, including merit pay and forced distributions. Thus the new model 
that emerged was different in that whereas wages in the traditional system had been 
attached to jobs rather than individuals, in the new model there was a pronounced move to 
tie wages to individual performance and competency in the form of individual incentives.  
It is in terms of this context, characterized by substantial firm autonomy, that Tichy, 
Fombrun, and Devanna’s (1984) HRM model is to be understood: that is, a model that 
emphasizes the systematic use of individual performance appraisals, individual 
performance-related rewards and outcomes-monitored training and development. 
   In summary, US HRM, with its stress on the close synchronization of human resource 
policies and activities with the overall business strategy through efficient reward and 
appraisal systems and development monitoring systems, is essentially indicative of a 
rational, calculative approach (Gooderham, et al., 1999). While based on an assumption of 
employer-employee unanimity, this is a unitarist rather a social partnership approach 
(Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994). 
  It is important to note that we do not pretend in any way to cover HRM as a whole but 
that we focus on indicators of the calculative approach to managing human resources, that 
is, individual performance appraisal, individual rewards systems, and monitoring of the 
effects of training.  
 
National Contexts 
   In his book Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (1991) Michel Albert distinguished on the 
one hand between US or ‘Anglo-Saxon’ capitalism and on the other a continental, West 
European type of capitalism which he labelled the ‘Rhineland model’. The former is a 
‘shareholder economy’ under which private enterprise is about maximising short-term 
profits for investors rather than any broader harmony of interests. In contrast “…the 
Rhineland model may be viewed as a regulated market economy with a comprehensive 
system of social security. Government, employers' organisations and labour unions 
consult each other about economic goals (in order to) try to achieve a harmony of 
interests” (Bolkestein, 1999). In short the Rhineland model is a ‘stakeholder economy’ in 
which competition and confrontation is avoided in the belief that it undermines 
sustainable, stable economic growth. Patrolling this economy is the state, which variously 
acts as a referee, guarantor, employer and owner.  
  A more recent distinction within the national business systems approach is between the 
“liberal market economies” (LMEs) of the US, the UK, Ireland and Australia and the 
“coordinated market economies” (CMEs) of much of Continental Europe (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001).  Firms operating in the latter context are regarded as significantly more 
institutionally embedded than those in the former, in the sense that they operate within 
contexts whose legal frameworks and systems of industrial relations constrain them from 
applying market driven or technologically contingent management practices particularly 
in regard to pay policy. Whereas in LMEs there are substantial pay differentials even 
within the same industries, in CMEs much pay negotiation occurs at the industry level, 
taking pay negotiation out of the workplace.  
   At a general level in Europe substantial firm autonomy and weak trade unions is the 
exception rather than the rule. Thus Pieper (1990:8) has concluded that “…The major 
difference between HRM in the US and in Western Europe is the degree to which [HRM] 
is influenced and determined by state regulations.  Companies have a narrower scope of 
choice in regard to personnel management than in the US”.  Let us review the archetypal 
CME setting, Germany and thereafter the Scandinavian setting, as illustrated by Denmark 





   Although unionization in German work-life has dropped considerably since the 1970s, 
and in 1994 was down to 30 percent, over 90 percent of the workforce is covered by 
collective bargaining agreements which are the exclusive territory of the labor unions in a 
system of regional, industry-wide bargaining (Scholz, 1996). In addition, attention should 
be drawn to the elaborate German system of co-determination, which is regulated at the 
plant level by the Works Constitution Act of 1972 and at the enterprise level by the Works 
Constitution Act of 1952, superseded by the “Mitbestimmungsgesetz” (MitbestG) of 
1976 (cf. Hollingsworth, 1997). As a consequence of this legislation, employers need to 
maintain positive relations with the works councils. These are powerful, employee-elected 
bodies legally entitled to co-determination, consultation, and access to important 
information, hence restricting the degree of managerial autonomy (Scholz, 1996; Streeck, 
1997; Wächter and Müller-Camen, 2002; Wächter and Stengelhofen, 1995).  
   This is not to say that various techniques associated with the calculative HRM model are 
completely absent but that their potential use has invariably been subject to the critical eye 
of the works councils (Lane, 1994). Not least, these councils have also sought to preserve 
the strong traditions of social welfare that have characterized employers' treatment of their 
human resources.  
   Hassel (1999) has claimed that German industrial relations have been eroded during the 
last two decades. One important aspect to her “erosion” thesis is that the institutional base 
of the German industrial system has not been able to transfer its institutions into the 
growing segment of small and medium-sized companies in the private service sector. In 
other words the German industrial relations system is increasingly concentrated on large 
companies in the manufacturing sector. Opposing this thesis Klikauer (2002) argues that 
the system remains intact and that any changes relate to unification and the public sector.  
To underpin this argument he inter alia employs Hassel’s own data that shows that 97.2 
per cent of all workplaces above 300 workers have works councils. While we do not aim 
at resolving this debate it should be pointed out the data set we will employ in this paper 
excludes smaller firms, i.e. firms with fewer than one hundred employees. Furthermore, as 
we will indicate, our analysis controls for the effect of sector or industry. In other words 
our analysis is largely concerned with what Hassel (1999: 502) refers to as “the backbone 
of the German model” that is indisputably characterized not only by powerful labor 
representative bodies but also by strong work legislation. Hence, in terms of the context of 
our analysis low scores on calculative HRM can be expected not only for indigenous 
German firms, but also for subsidiaries of US MNCs. 
 
Denmark and Norway  
   In a comparison of the legislative environment for work-life in Denmark and Norway 
Graver (1995) observes that in both of these countries there is a strong and pronounced 
framework intended to ensure that conflicts are resolved at the firm-level. In both 
countries, in regard to issues relating to major structural changes, such as downsizing, 
outsourcing, and potential mergers, labor unions are legally entitled to be consulted.  
However, as Graver (1995) indicates, the legislative framework is more general than that 
of Germany thereby permitting experiments with novel HRM practices. In summary, we 
find that in Denmark and Norway labor unions generally both possess and exert 
considerable influence on the management of firms (Bévort, Pedersen and Sundbo, 1995). 
Together with the fact that individual rights of employees are strongly protected by laws 
and agreements this means that the general autonomy of management is significantly 
restricted (Kristensen, 1992). The consequence should be that the personnel functions of 
subsidiaries of US MNCs as well as indigenous firms have limited latitude to apply 
calculative practices.   
   Thus far we have reviewed two prototypical Western European stakeholder settings. 
However, within Europe there are two markedly deviant national settings. The first of 
these is the United Kingdom the other is Ireland.  
 
United Kingdom 
   The United Kingdom is unique in the European context in that during the 1980s its 
employment legislation was subject to radical changes. Most notably, this legislation 
includes the Employment Acts of 1980, 1982, 1988 and 1990, and the Trade Union Act of 
1984. Coupled to these acts are severe civil penalties. Together, these acts curbed the 
unions' right to recognition, outlawed the closed shop and secondary picketing, and 
narrowed the freedom of unions to call strikes (for instance, by a requirement that a secret 
ballot of the members is to be called first). The result was a considerable increase in 
general managerial autonomy (Edwards et al., 1992) and the opportunity to innovate in 
employment and labor strategies (Mabey and Iles, 1996; Rubery and Wilkinson, 1994). In 
a review of trends in HRM in the UK based on the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 
from 1998, Richbell (2002) observes that this opportunity has resulted in a pronounced 
move away from standard pay scales towards systems which reflect individual 
performance and behaviour such as the increased use of the core calculative practice of 
performance related pay. 
 In summary, given the change in institutional context in the UK, it is reasonable to 
expect that not only do indigenous firms demonstrate a propensity for the adoption of 
calculative practices but that subsidiaries of US MNCs will also freely apply their 
calculative HRM practices. 
 Australia 
  In the early part of the twentieth century Australia developed a system of industrial 
relations characterized by compulsory arbitration (Dabscheck, 2004). That is, state 
agencies gained the authority to settle disputes and make binding agreements that 
prescribed wages and working conditions.  However, Barry and Wailes (2004) observe 
that this system was so significantly modified in 1993 with the introduction of the 
Industrial Relations Reform Act that it is questionable whether it is possible to speak of an 
arbitral model in Australia after this point in time. Not only did it limit the terms and 
conditions of bargaining but it also effectively created the possibility of legally sanctioned 
non-union agreements.  The Workplace Relations Act of 1996 further constrained the 
scope of the authority of the Australian arbitration system in regard to non-union 
individual agreements.  The resultant fragmentation of channels of wage determination 
produced substantial fragmentation of wage outcomes.  Changes in legislation were 
accompanied by major decline in unionization: in 1992 39.6 per cent of the Australian 
workforce were members of trade unions, in 1999 it was 25.7 per cent (Barry and Wailes, 
2004).   
  In the light of these radical changes to the Australian regulatory framework as well the 
empirical evidence of divergent wage outcomes it seems reasonable to expect that we may 
observe the adoption of calculative HRM practices by indigenous firms. In addition the 
regulatory framework means that subsidiaries of US MNCs will also be free to apply their 
calculative HRM practices within the Australian context. 
  
 
Ireland   
The Irish national context is ostensibly contiguous with that of the Rhineland context in 
that trade unions enjoy strong legitimacy and collective bargaining rights. The trade union 
movement is a key actor in shaping economic and social policy in its role as a “social 
partner” (Gunnigle et al., 2002). However, since the early 1980s Ireland may be 
distinguished from Rhineland Europe in that its pursuit of foreign direct investment has 
caused it to grant legitimacy to “green-field” sites, which allow firms generous amounts of 
freedom to decide their preferred form of industrial relations (Gunnigle and McGuire, 
2001). Significantly, research has indicated that it is primarily US MNCs that have used 
this latitude to pursue a unitary style of management characterized by a strong level of 
calculative HRM practices combined with non-union agreements (Gunnigle et al., 1997).   
 
Hypotheses 
   On the basis of the above we may hypothesize as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: The use of calculative HRM practices will be significantly higher in US 
subsidiaries than in indigenous firms in all countries. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The use of calculative HRM practices will be significantly lower in 
indigenous German, Danish/Norwegian and Irish firms than in indigenous UK and 
Australian firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The use of calculative HRM practices in US subsidiaries will be 




To test our predictions we have employed data derived from the 1999 Euronet-Cranfield 
survey of HRM in European and a range of non-European countries. The overall strategy of 
the survey has been to mail appropriately translated questionnaires to personnel managers in 
representative national samples of firms with more than one hundred employees (Brewster et 
al., 1996). Although the response rate for the individual countries is relatively low, mostly 
between 20 and 35 per cent, analyses suggest that statistical representativeness has not been 
impaired (Brewster et al., 1994).  
   Our initial sample comprised 3,186 private sector firms located in the UK, Ireland, 
Denmark/Norway, (former West) Germany and Australia. After removing firms that were 
neither indigenous nor fully-owned US subsidiaries our net sample consisted of 2769 firms. 
For the UK the sample comprised 988 firms, for Ireland 349, for Denmark/Norway 753, for 
Germany 456, and for Australia 223.The percentage of US owned firms varies from a low of 
4 percent in Denmark/Norway, through 8 and 11 per cent respectively in Germany and the 
UK respectively to 22  per cent in Ireland, and 23 per cent in Australia.  These marked 
national differences in the proportion of US owned firms in our sample are not surprising 
given the very different shares of foreign ownership in each of the economies (OECD, 2001). 
 
The Mokken Scaling Model 
To develop the scales for calculative HRM-practices we have used Mokken’s latent trait 
model for unidimensional scaling (Sijtsma & Molenaar 2002). The model was first 
developed for dichotomous “0 – 1”-items as used in our application.  A Mokken scale 
builds on the idea of cumulativeness in Guttman's approach, but  the probabilistic nature 
of Mokken’s model allows for non-perfect response patterns. The probability of success 
(score “1”) on a particular items depends on the subject’s (firm’s) location on the latent 
trait, and is called its item response function (IRT). These functions may have the shape of 
a logistic curve. This is assumed in the parametric IRT models where the IRTs for 
different items differ only in the parameters of the logistic curve.  Mokken’s model of 
monotone homogeneity poses no other restrictions than increasing IRFs and is designed to 
order subjects on the latent trait (Sijtsma & Molenaar 2002). A Mokken scale is 
nonparametric in the sense that the IRF curve does not have to have a special form. This 
makes the model very flexible, but also implies that neither the subject (firm) parameters 
nor the item parameters may be estimated directly. However, the unweighted sum of item 
scores is monotonously related to the latent true score (Sijtsma & Molenaar 2002: 15). This 
means that the Mokken model only provides estimates of scale scores at an ordinal level, 
whereas parametric IRT models allow for direct estimation of the true scores. However, 
the strong assumptions of the latter models contribute to limiting their applicability.  
    The primary scaling criterion is Loevinger’s H coefficient of homogeneity. This is 
defined as: Hij = 1 - (Fij /Eij), where Fij is the sum of observed errors according to the 
Guttman scale model (i.e., the observed number of respondents who give a negative 
response to the "easier" item and a positive response to the more  "difficult" item), and Eij 
is the expected number of errors assuming that the responses to the items are independent 
across persons and that the marginal distributions are fixed (Sijtsma & Molenaar 2002). In 
the same way, the scalability of a single item with respect to the other items is defined by 
Hi, and the scalability of the total scale is measured by H. A set of items constitutes a scale 
if all Hij >0, and if every item coefficient of scalability, Hi , is larger than a constant c, set 
to at least 0.30. All Hi and the H should be significantly greater than zero according to a 
given level of significance. The total scale ought to have an H-value of at least 0.30 to 
form a weak scale. H-values between 0.40 and 0.50 indicate average scales and values 
above 0.50 indicate strong scales. The Mokken scaling model is implemented in the 
computer program MSP5 for Windows (Molenaar and Sijtsma, 2000).  
    
       The Dependent Variable 
  In order to measure the use of calculative HRM-practices we have developed a Calc 
scale based on 10 dichotomous items from the Euronet-Cranfield questionnaire : 
“individual performance appraisals” (items ca1-ca4), “individual rewards systems” (items 
ca5-ca8), and “monitoring the effectiveness of training” (items ca9, ca10). The scale was 
constructed using Mokken’s scaling model as implemented in the MSP5 for5 Windows.  
Table 1 shows all items, ordered by sample difficulties, that is, by their means. As all 
items are dichotomous (0 - 1), the means are the proportion of firms employing the 
management practice in question.  The cumulative nature of the items in Table 1 is 
evident. Performance appraisals are more commonly used than merit pay. Within the two 
groups of items, the hierarchy is also evident. Merit pay for manuals is less frequent than 
for professionals and managers. Performance appraisals for managers are much more 
frequently used than performance appraisals for manuals. Taken together this indicates 
that a cumulative scaling model is appropriate  
   The main output from MSP5 is the H-statistic displayed in the second column of Table 
1. The H-value for the Calc scale is 0.52 and indicates a strong scale. The reliability 
analysis also gave satisfactory results. A Cronbach's alpha of 0.85, shows that the scale’s 
internal consistency is well above the standard minimum of 0.7. The average inter-item 
correlation of 0.36 is also satisfactory. On the whole, the item-scale correlations are 
satisfactory (i.e. > 0.30). In conclusion, the 10-item scale of calculative HRM practices 
performs satisfactorily both in terms of scalability and reliability. 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
    The Calc scale scores for each firm is calculated as the mean values of valid scores, i.e. 
0 or 1, on the items, and multiplied by 100 so that the resulting scale varies between 0 and 
100. Cases with valid values on less than seven indicators are coded as missing. High 
scores indicate extensive use of calculative HRM-practices.  
 Independent variables 
   In addition to Country, our study includes four additional independent variables: 
industry, size, the strategy or market orientation of the firm, and the date when the 
firm was established in its particular setting.   
   Institutional theory assumes that industries develop along particular trajectories 
characterized by distinct economic and organizational dynamics that distinguish them 
from other industries (Hollingsworth et al., 1993). Because of this we include a 
variable that distinguishes manufacturing from banking and finance, construction, 
transport, personal services and other industries.  
   As noted by Scott (1998), most studies of the relation between organizational size 
and structure indicate that size, in terms of the number of employees, tends to influence 
the methods used for controlling and coordinating employees. The evidence suggests 
that the larger the size of the organization, the more standardization of HRM 
procedures (Pugh and Hickson, 1969).  
   The strategy of the firm is measured in terms of whether its main market is local or 
international.  It is reasonable to suppose that subsidiaries of MNCs that are oriented 
towards purely local markets will be more prone to adapt to local institutional 
conditions than those whose function is global in the sense that they are producing for 
international markets. Likewise it may be supposed that indigenous firms with a global 
orientation will be more inclined to look beyond local best practices. 
   Finally we distinguish between firms that have been in the institutional setting for 
twenty years or more and more recent creations. The latter may be supposed to be less 
infused by the norms of the local environment than the former. 
 
Results 
Table 2 documents the variables to be used in the regression analysis. The dependent 
variable is the Calc scale with a mean of 51 in our sample and a standard deviation of 
30.4. Lnsize is the natural logarithm of firm size, i.e. the number of employees. 
Industry is a categorical regressor represented by five 0 – 1-variables with 
Manufacturing as the reference category. Another two dummy variables represent 
whether the main market for the firm is abroad and whether the firm is established 
recently, i.e. in the period 1980-99. Country is a categorical regressor represented by 
dummy variables for Ireland, Denmark/Norway (grouped together), Germany and 
Australia, with the UK as the reference category. USS indicates whether the firm is 
US owned (USS=1) or indigenous (USS=0). Finally, we have the four USS by 
Country interaction terms: USS*IR, USS*Den/Nor, USS*Ger, and USS*AUS.  
 
----------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
 
The multiple regression analysis with Calc as the dependent variable is documented in 
Table 3. The first set of regressors function as controls: firm size, industry, the 
strategy or market orientation of the firm, and the date the firm was established in its 
particular setting. Our main independent variables are the USS, the country indicators, 
and the USS by Country interactions.  
    Let us start by describing the results for the control variables. Firm size has a positive 
and relatively strong statistically significant effect on the use of calculative HRM-
practices. This means that large firms use such practices to a greater extent than small 
firms, controlling for the remaining variables in the model.  Among the industries only 
Banking and finance score significantly higher on the Calc scale than the reference 
category, Manufacturing. Firms with foreign markets and firms that are established the 
last 20 years show more extensive use of calculative practices than firms with national 
markets and firms that are established before 1980. In total the controls explains about 9% 
of the variation in the Calc scale.  
   The next group of variables in Table 3 are the main effects of the country indicators. 
Since the latter are also included in the USS by Country interaction terms, they must 
be interpreted as the difference in the Calc score from the UK (the reference category) 
for indigenous firms. Thus, the negative coefficients for Ireland, Denmark/Norway 
and Germany indicate a less extensive use of calculative HRM-practices than in 
indigenous UK-firms. Indigenous firms in Denmark/Norway score on the average 
about 31 points lower on the Calc scale than indigenous UK-firms.  The positive 
coefficient for Australia means that indigenous Australian firms score significantly 
higher on the Calc scale than do indigenous UK firms. The multiple correlation 
coefficients in the second panel of Table 2 show that the country indicators explain 
about 20% of the variance that remains in the dependent variable after the control 
variables were introduced in the first step. This is a further indication of rather 
pronounced country differences in the use of calculative HRM-practices.                                      
                 
                                     ----------------------------- 
                                      Insert Table 3 about here 
                                   -------------------------------- 
  The last set of variables in Table 3 is the USS, which indicates whether the firm is a 
US subsidiary or an indigenous firm, and the four design variables for the USS by 
Country interaction. Three of the five variables in the set have statistically significant 
effects beyond the .05 level. The interaction terms for Germany and Australia are, 
however, not statistically significant at any conventional level. This means that the 
increase in the use of calculative practices by US-owned firms in Germany and 
Australia compared to indigenous firms is about the same in those two countries as in 
the UK. To make for a more accessible interpretation of the results for the country 
indicators, the USS, and the interaction terms, the main results from the regression 
analysis are displayed in a more intuitive way in Figure 1. This figure shows the 
predicted means on the Calc scale for the eight combinations of country and US 
ownership, with control variables set to their means.    
                                               ------------------------------ 
                                                 Insert Figure 1 about here 
                                               ------------------------------  
The white and dotted columns show the level of the use of calculative HRM-practices 
in indigenous firms in the five countries. Use of such practices is more common in the 
UK than in Ireland and Germany, and much more common in the UK than in 
Denmark/Norway. Indigenous Australian firms do, however, exceed UK firms in the 
adoption of calculative HRM-practices. The dark striped columns show the use of the 
selected practices in US subsidiaries which is substantially lower in US subsidiaries 
located in Denmark/Norway and Germany than in Ireland, the UK and Australia.  
 
Discussion 
Our overall proposition was informed by the national business systems approach 
implying that foreign subsidiaries of MNCs will tend to adapt their managerial 
practices to the specific national, institutional conditions within which they operate.  
We have pursued this issue through a study of the degree to which national 
adaptations made by MNC subsidiaries reflect the degree of divergence between the 
national subsidiary context and parent country institutional contexts. The analysis was 
focussed on subsidiaries of US multinationals in four European settings as well as 
Australia and to their application of three core calculative HRM practices. Clearly 
future research should extend our analysis both in terms of subsidiary nationality, host 
countries and range of management practices. While mindful of these limitations it is 
reasonable to suggest that our findings are supportive of the overall proposition.  
  The first hypothesis was the broadest of the three in the sense that it contrasted US 
subsidiaries’ use of these three HRM practices with the use of similar practices in 
indigenous firms in all of the five selected countries. This was supported by the 
empirical analysis hence indicating support also for the overall proposition concerning 
the influence of national embeddedness of foreign subsidiaries of MNCs..   
   Our second hypothesis was concerned with establishing that there are significant 
differences by country between indigenous firms in terms of the use they are 
institutionally able to make of calculative HRM. Our findings support the conception 
that the UK and Australia represent amenable settings for calculative HRM.  
   The third hypothesis focussed on the degree to which US subsidiaries adapt to the 
five dissimilar national settings. The clearly lower means for US subsidiaries in 
Denmark/Norway and Germany compared to US subsidiaries located in the UK, 
Australia and Ireland indicate that US subsidiaries adapt to the local institutional 
setting. Thus hypothesis 3 is also supported. The effect of being a US subsidiary is, 
however, not uniform for these two CME settings, in that it is larger for 
Denmark/Norway than for Germany, possibly reflecting the less legalistic nature of 
the Danish/Norwegian setting. In line with our institutional analysis we can observe a 
substantial effect of being a US subsidiary in Ireland due to the dualistic nature of the 
Irish institutional setting. The use US subsidiaries are able to make of calculative 
practices in green-field Ireland is similar to that of the deregulated UK. This 
institutional latitude may represent at least a partial explanation of Ireland’s and the 
UK’s attractiveness as destinations for US foreign direct investment.  In regard to 
Australia our findings indicate considerable use of calculative HRM practices by 
indigenous firms and even greater use by subsidiaries of US MNCs. Clearly the 
legislative changes of the 1990s have created a very favourable setting for the 
application of calculative HRM practices.  
    Our findings also indicate that in regard to the indicators of a calculative HRM 
approach, US MNCs consistently diverge from their host country counterparts 
including the UK and Australia. As Ferner (2000) has surmised, this suggests that 
subsidiaries of US MNCs to a significant extent attempt to take with them and apply 
their own, nationally idiosyncratic, repertoire of HRM practices to their subsidiaries in 
foreign countries. However, our results for Denmark/Norway and Germany indicate 
that they nevertheless experience constraints in doing this. Hence our findings 
illustrate the notion of “tension” that Kostova and Roth (2002) refer to, between the 
need for local adaptation and global integration.  
   The theoretical implication for our understanding of the transfer of management 
practices by MNCs is that, while rational explanations have some validity, they must 
supplemented with institutional perspectives not least those contained in the national 
business systems approach.  
  Finally, it should be pointed out that this study has several limitations in regard to 
addressing the broad proposition that was our point of departure. One is that we have 
only focussed on three HRM practices and further studies should attempt to analyse a 
wider array of such practices, for instance, the use of various forms of collaborative 
practices and “welfare capitalist” social partnerships (cf. Gooderham et al., 1999; 
Ferner, 2000). A number of other limitations to the study derive from the empirical 
study itself. First, the response rate in the Cranet survey was relatively low and this 
may have introduced selection biases. Second, we have applied cross-sectional data 
that make it impossible to distinguish the effects of diffusion of HRM practices on the 
one hand and the potentially hampering effects of inert national institutions on the 
other. Doing this would require longitudinal data. Third, the application of certain 
HRM practices does not indicate whether these are actually used with the same degree 
of intensity or rigor in dissimilar settings.  
  Fourth, our analysis is limited to US MNCs. Ferner (2000) has argued that due to the 
hegemonic position of the USA in the international economy and polity US MNCs are 
particularly prone to presume the one-way-best superiority of the American model. In 
other words our findings may apply to a lesser degree to MNCs with other national 
origins. 
  It is, moreover, important to note that we have been not been preoccupied with 
possible effects of the selected HRM practices on firm performance. A crucial and 
unresolved issue relates to which types of HRM practices that contribute to increasing 
or decreasing organizational effectiveness and performance and under what 
circumstances.   
 
References 
Albert, M., (1991). Capitalisme contre Capitalisme. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 
Barry, M. and Wailes, N. (2004). Contrasting systems? 100 years of arbitration in Australia  
and New Zealand. Journal of Industrial Relations, 46(4), 430-447. 
Bévort, F.,  J.S. Pedersen, J.S. and J. Sundbo, (1995)  ‘Denmark’.  In I. Brunstein (Ed.),  
Human Resource Management in Western Europe. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Bolkestein, F. (1999). ‘The Dutch model’. The Economist, 351. 8120, 115-116. 
Brewster, C., Hegewisch, A., Mayne, L. and O. Tregaskis, (1994). ‘Methodology of the Price  
 Waterhouse Cranfield Project’. In  Brewster, C. and Hegewisch, A. (Eds.), Policy and  
 Practice in European Human Resource Management. London: Routledge. 
Brewster, C., Tregaskis, O., Hegewisch, A., and L. Mayne, (1996). ‘Comparative Research in  
Human Research Management: A Review and an Example’. International Journal of   
Human Resource Management, 7, 585-604. 
Dabscheck, B. (2004). Arbitration and relations between the parties.  Journal of Industrial  
Relations, 46(4), 385-399. 
DiMaggio, P.J., (1983). ‘State expansion and organization fields’. In R.H. Hall and R.E.  
Quinn (Eds.), Organization Theory and Public Policy (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage).   
DiMaggio, P.J. and W.W.Powell, (1983) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism  
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’. American Sociological Review,  
48, 147-160. 
DiMaggio, P.J. and W.W.Powell, (1991). ‘Introduction’. In W.W. Powell  and P.J. DiMaggio       
(Eds.), The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press). 
Dobbin, F. Sutton, J.R., Meyer, J.W. and Scott, W.R. (1993). Equal opportunity law and the  
construction of internal labor markets. American Journal of Sociology, 99(2), 396-427. 
Edwards, T. and Ferner, A. (2000). The renewed ‘American challenge’: a review of  
employment practices in US multinationals. Paper presented at The 50th Universities 
Industrial Relations Association’s Annual Conference, Warwick, July 7-9. 
Edwards, P. Hall, M., Hyman, R., Marginson, P., Sisson, K., Waddington, J. and D.  
Winchester, (1992). ‘Great Britain: Still muddling through’. In A. Ferner and R.  
Hyman (Eds.), Industrial Relations in the New Europe (Oxford: Blackwell).   
Ferner, A. (1997). Country of origin effects and HRM in multinational corporations. Human  
Resource Management, 7 (1), 19-37. 
Ferner, A., (2000) The Embededness of US Multinational Companies in the US Business  
System : implications for HR/IR, Occasional Paper 61, December 2000 
Ferner, A. (2003). Foreign multinationals and industrial relations innovations in Britain. In  
P. Edwards (Ed.), Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice (2nd ed). Oxford:  
Blackwell (81-103). 
Ferner, A., Almond, P., Clark, I., Colling, T., Edwards, T., Holden, L., & Muller-Camen, M.  
 (2004). The dynamics of central control and subsidiary autonomy in the management  
 of human resources: case study evidence from US MNCs in the UK. Organization  
 Studies, 25(3): 363-391. 
Geppert, M. (2002). Learning and knowledge sharing in MNCs: an Anglo-German  
comparison. Conference Paper, Second Annual EURAM Conference on Innovative  
Research in Management, Stockholm, May 9-11.  
Geppert, M., Matten, D. and Williams, K. (2001). The design of work systems in national  
  subisidiaries of multinational companies: globalisation, national institutions and  
managerial choice. EBMS Working Paper 2001/7. Swansea: European Business  
Management School. 
Geppert, M., Matten, D. and Williams, K. (2002). Global change management approaches in  
MNCs and distinct national trajectories: Britain and Germany compared. In  
M.Geppert, D.Matten and K.Williams (eds.), Challenges for Human Resource  
Management in a Global Context. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Geppert, M., Matten, D. and Williams, K. (2003). Change management in MNCs: how  
global convergence intertwines with national diversities. Human Relations, 56 (7),  
807-838. 
Gooderham, P., Nordhaug, O., & Ringdal, K. (1998). When in Rome, do they do as the  
 Romans? HRM practices of US subsidiaries in Europe. Management International  
 Review, 38 (2), 47-64.  
Gooderham, P.N., Nordhaug, O. and K. Ringdal, (1999). ‘Institutional and rational  
determinants of organizational practices: Human resource management in European 
firms’.  Administrative Science Quarterly, 44 pp507-531. 
Graver, H. P. (1995). ’Reguleringsmodeller i arbeidsretten’. (Regulatory models in labor  
law). In D. Olberg (Ed.), Endringer i arbeidslivets organisering. (Changes in the   
Organization of Work Life. Oslo: Fafo.  
Gulati, R. (1999). Network location and learning: the influence of network resources and firm  
capabilities on alliance formation. Strategic Management Journal, 20 (5), 397-420. 
Gunnigle, P. and McGuire, D. ( 2001). Why Ireland? A qualitative review of the factors  
influencing the location of US multinationals in Ireland with particular reference to the  
impact of labour issues. Economic and Social Review, Vol. 32. No. 1: 43-67. 
Gunnigle, P., Morley, M. and T. Turner (1997). ‘Challenging collectivist traditions:  
individualism and the management of industrial relations in greenfield sites’. 
Economic and Social Review, 28, 105-134. 
Gunnigle, P., O’Sullivan, M. and M. Kinsella (2002). ‘Organised labour in the new economy:  
Trade Unions and Public Policy in the Republic of Ireland’.  In D. D’Art and T.  
Turner (Eds.), Irish Employment Relations in the New Economy. Dublin: Blackhall  
Press. 
Hall, P.A. and Gingerich, D.W. (2004). Varieties of capitalism and institutional  
  complementarities in the macroeconomy. MPIfG Discussion paper 04/5. Berlin: Max- 
Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung. 
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (eds.) (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional  
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hall, P.A. and Sockice, D. (2003). Varieties of capitalism and institutional change: a  
response to three critics. Comparative European Politics, 1, 241-250. 
Harzing, A.W.K. (2002). ‘Acquisitions versus greenfield investments: international strategy  
and management of entry modes’. Strategic Management Journal, 23 (3), 211-227. 
Harzing, A.W.K. and Sorge, A. (2003). The relative impact of country origin and universal  
contingencies on internationalization strategies and corporate control in multinational  
enterprises: worldwide and European perspectives. Organization Studies, 24 (2), 187-
214. 
Hassel, A., (1999). ‘The erosion of industrial relations in Germany’. British Journal of  
Industrial Relations, 37 (3), 483-505. 
Hitt, M., Ahlstrom, D., Dacin, M.T., Levitas, E., and Svobodina, L. (2004). The institutional  
effects on strategic alliance partner selection in transition economies: China vs.  
Russia. Organization Science, 15(2), 173-185. 
Hollingsworth, J. R., (1997). ‘Continuities and changes in social systems of production: The  
cases of Japan, Germany, and the United States’. In J.R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer  
(Eds.), Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions. Cambridge,  
MA: Cambridge University Press. 
Hollingsworth, J. R., Schmitter, P., and W. Streeck, (1993). Governing Capitalist Economies:  
Performance and Control of Economic Sectors (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Klikauer, T., (2002). ‘Stability in Germany’s industrial relations: A critique on Hassel’s  
erosion thesis’. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 40 (2), 295-308. 
Kochan, T.A., Katz, H.C. and R.B. McKersie, (1989). The Transformation of American  
Industrial Relations. New York: Basic Books. 
Kostova, T. and K. Roth, (2002). ‘Adoption of an organizational practice by subsidiaries of  
multinational corporations: institutional and relational effects’. Academy of 
Management Journal, 45 (1),  215-233. 
Kristensen, P.H., (1992). ‘Strategies against structures: Institutions and economic  
organizations in Denmark’. In R.Whitley (Ed.), European Business Systems. London: 
Sage.  
Mabey, C. and P. Iles, (1996) ‘Human resource management in the UK: a case of  
fundamental change, facelift or façade?’ In T. Clark (Ed.), European Human Resource   
Management. Oxford: Blackwell (34-64). 
Maurice, M. & Sorge. A. (2000) (Eds.). Embedding Organizations: Societal Analysis of  
Actors, Organizations, and Socio-Economic Content. Philadelphia, PA: John  
Benjamins. 
Mayer, M. and Whittington, R. (2002). ‘For boundedness in the study of  comparative       and  
international business: The case of the diversified multidivisional corporation.’ In  
M.Geppert, D.Matten and K.Williams (eds.), Challenges for Human Resource  
Management in a Global Context. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
McNamara, G., Deephouse, D.L., and Luce, R. (2002). Competitive positioning within and  
across a strategic group structure: the performance of core, secondary, and solitary  
firms. Strategic Management Journal, 24 (2), 161-181. 
Molenaar I.W. and  K. Sijtsma, (2000).  MSP5 for Windows, User’s Manual. A Program for  
Mokken Scale Analysis for Polychotomous Items (Groningen. The Netherlands: iec     
ProGAMMA). 
Myloni, B., Harzing, A.W.K. and Mirza, H. (2004). Host country specific factors and the  
transfer of human resource management practices in multinational companies.  
International Journal of Manpower, 25 (6), 518-534. 
OECD, (2001). Activities of foreign affiliates databases. www.oecd.org. 
Peng, M.W. (2005). Perspectives – from China strategy to global strategy. Asia Pacific  
Journal of Management, 22 (2), 123-141. 
Peng, M.W., Lee, S-H., and Wang, D.Y.L. (2005). What determines the scope of the firm  
over time? A focus on institutional relatedness. Academy of Management Review, 30  
(3), 622-633. 
Pieper, R. (1990) (Ed.). Human Resource Management: An International Comparison. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter. 
Piore, M. and Sabel, C. (1984). The Second Industrial Divide. New York: Basic Books. 
Powell, W.W. and DiMaggio P.J. (Eds) (1991). The New Institutionalism in Organizational  
Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Pugh, D.S. and D.J. Hickson,  (1969). Organizational Structure in its Context: The Aston  
Programme I. Lexington, MA: Heath. 
Richbell, S., (2002) ‘Trends and emerging values in human resource management - The UK  
scene’. International Journal of Manpower, 22.3 pp261-268. 
Rubery, J. and F. Wilkinson, (1994). Employer Strategy and the Labour Market. Oxford:  
Oxford University Press. 
Scholz, C., (1996). ‘Human resource management in Germany’. In T. Clark (Ed.), European  
Human Resource Management. Oxford: Blackwell (118-155). 
Schuler, R.S. & Rogovsky, N. (1998). Understanding compensation practice variations  
across firms: the impact of national culture. Journal of International Business Studies,  
29 (1), 159-177. 
Scott, W.R. (1995). Institutions and Organizations. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Scott, W. R. (1998).  Organizations. Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. (4th ed.). Upper  
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
Sijtsma, K. and  I. W. Molenaar (2002). Introduction to Nonparametric Item Response  
             Theory. London: Sage. 
Sorge, A. (2004). Cross national differences in human resources and organizations. In  
A.W.K. Harzing & J. van Ruysseveldt. (eds.), International Human Resource  
Management (2nd ed.). London: Sage. 
Sparrow, P. and M. Hiltrop, (1994). European Human Resource Management in Transition.  
New York: Prentice Hall. 
Streeck, W. (1997). The German economic model: Does it exist? Can it survive? In  
C.Crouch and W.Streeck (eds.), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism: Mapping  
Convergence and Diversity. London: Sage (33-54). 
Tichy, N.M. Fombrun, C.J. and M.A. Devanna, (1984). ‘The organizational context of  
strategic human resource management’. In C.J. Fombrun, N. M. Tichy and M.A. 
Devanna (Eds.), Strategic Human Resource Management. New York: Wiley. 
Weinstein, M. and T. Kochan, (1995). ‘The Limits of Diffusion: Recent Developments in  
Industrial Relations and Human Resource Practices in the United States’. In R. Locke, 
T. Kochan and M. Piore (Eds.), Employment Relations in a Changing World Economy. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Wächter, H. and M. Müller-Camen (2002). ‘Co-determination and strategic integration in  
German firms’. Human Resource Management Journal 12 (3), 76-87. 
Wächter, H. and T. Stengelhofen (1995). ’Germany’.  In I. Brunstein (Ed.), Human Resource  
Management in Western Europe. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Whitley, R. (1992) (Ed.). European Business Systems. London: Sage. 
Whitley, R. (1999). Divergent Capitalisms. The Social Structuring and Change of Business  














Scalability and reliability analysis of scales of calculative dimensions. 
(Euronet-Cranfield data, net sample by listwise deletion among items, n=2573. 
 Items ordered by sample difficulties (means). 
 
   Mean Hwgt* Corr.** 
Calc Calculative scale, 10 items,  
(Cronbach’s alpha=0.85) 
- 0.52 0.36 
Ca8 Merit pay: manual 0.24 0.46 0.38 
Ca7 Merit pay: clerical 0.29 0.59 0.56 
Ca6 Merit pay: professionals 0.35 0.53 0.55 
Ca5 Merit pay: managers 0.39 0.46 0.49 
Ca4 Performance appraisals: manual 0.51 0.47 0.52 
Ca10 Formal evaluation: details 0.57 0.43 0.48 
Ca9 Formal evaluation of training 0.61 0.43 0.49 
Ca3 Performance appraisals: clerical 0.61 0.59 0.68 
Ca2 Performance appraisals: professionals 0.66 0.63 0.68 
Ca1 Performance appraisals: managers 0.69 0.61 0.63 
* Estimated by MSP: Mokken Scaling Program, Hwgt: Loevinger's coefficient of 
homogeneity, weighted.  
** Estimated by SPSS Reliability,  Mean: means of dichotomized items.           
Corr.: average inter-item correlations for scales and corrected item--scale 
correlations for items.   
TABLE 2. 
Descriptive statistics for variables in the regression analysis, n=2769. 
      
 Variables with description Min. Max. Mean Std.
Calc Scale for calculative HRM practices 0 100 51.043 30.439
Lnsize The natural log of firm size (# employees) 1.39 15.78 6.2094 1.35516
Industry Manufacturing (reference category) 0 1 0.389 0.488
 Construction 0 1 0.044 0.205
 Transport 0 1 0.047 0.211
 Banking and finance 0 1 0.084 0.278
 Personal services 0 1 0.094 0.292
 Other industries 0 1 0.342 0.474
Fmarket fmarket  Foreign markets, s6v10 0 1 0.494 0.500
Recent recent  Org established 1980-1999 0 1 0.209 0.407
Country UK   (reference category) 0 1 0.357 0.479
 Ireland 0 1 0.126 0.332
 Denmark/Norway 0 1 0.272 0.445
 Germany  0 1 0.165 0.371
 Australia 0 1 0.081 0.272
USS 1=US owned firm, 0= indigenous 0 1 0.109 0.312
USS*IR USS by Ireland interaction 0 1 0.028 0.165
USS*DN USS by  Denmark/Norway interaction 0 1 0.011 0.104
USS*GER USS by Germany interaction 0 1 0.014 0.116
USS*AUS USS by Australia interaction 0 1 0.019 0.136




 A multiple regression analysis of the scale measuring calculative HRM practices 
with dummy variables for countries. Euronet-Cranfield data, net sample by listwise 
deletion, n=2769. 
Regressors with description B  SE
Constant  39.426 ••••  2.829
Lnsize The natural logarithm of firm size 2.891 ••••  .383
Industry Manufacturing  (reference category)  
 Construction -1.754   2.505
 Transport 2.091   2.413
 Banking and finance 13.548 ••••  1.877
 Personal services .238   1.842
 Other industries  -0.984   1.276
Fmarket Foreign vs. national markets 6.744 ••••  1.109
Recent Organization established 1980-1999 3.784 ••••  1.217
Country UK (reference category)  
 Ireland -13.877 ••••  1.842
 Denmark/Norway -31.018 ••••  1.324
 Germany -18.254 ••••  1.559
 Australia 7.609 ••••  2.179
USS 1=US owned firm, 0= indigenous firm 6.718 ••  2.680
USS*IR Design variable for the USS by Country 
interaction: 1= US owned firm in Ireland, 
0 = otherwise 11.219 •••  4.245
USS*DN Design variable for the USS by Country 
interaction: 1= US owned firm in 
Denmark/Norway, 0 = otherwise 14.165 •••  5.445
USS*GER Design variable for the USS by Country 
interaction: 1= US owned firm in 
Germany, 0 = otherwise .881  5.078
USS*AUS Design variable for the USS by Country 
interaction: 1= US owned firm in 
Australia, 0 = otherwise 2.848  4.831
 R2whole model 0.304 ••••  
 R2controls (1) 0.093 ••••  
 R2country (2) 0.197 ••••  
 R2uss, interactions (3) 0.014 ••  
B: metric regression coefficient, SE: the standard error of B. Statistical significance of B 
(two-tailed): • p<0.10, •• p<0.05, ••• p<0.01, ••• • p<0.001. 
R2controls, R2country, uss and R2interactions are marginal increments in the R2 statistic by adding 
the regressors in the subscripts. The numbers in the parentheses indicate the order in 



























Figure 1. Use of calculative HRM practices in indigenous European and US subsidiaries 
in the UK, Ireland, Denmark/Norway, Germany and Australia. (Predicted values on the 
Calc scale are based on the regression analysis in Table 2 with the control variables set to 
their means.) 
 
 
